hope to ensure that the heart of moral treatment will withstand the effects of ever-changing theories, they must hold caring attitudes, words, and actions at the center of their practice. This article was accepted/or publication june 1, 1993 E arly caregivers struggled, as do helpers today, to practice in a manner that was both effective and caring. To understand how difficult it was to achieve that balance, one need only consider two discarded 19th-century treatment attempts and their curious connections with one another: moral treatment and phrenology. The historical influences of moral treatment and phrenology reveal the shaping force of rational construccions, or theories, on treatment practices in general. They also serve as less Cited examples of the manner in which health care narrowed its focus over the course of the 19th century from illness as a personal experience to disease as a pathological condition.
The 19th-centUlJ! practices of moral treatment and phrenology serve as historical examples of a narrowing focus in health care and reveal the manner in which theories can shape practice. The StOiJ! of moral treatment, as it is told in connection with phrenology, emphasizes the push for success and right solutions. The push followed several shifts in the conceptualization of mental illness, the last of which proved moral therapy unreasonable ifpractitioners in this centwy
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Suzanne M. Peloquin, PhD, OYR, practice in a manner that was both effective and caring. To understand how difficult it was to achieve that balance, one need only consider two discarded 19th-century treatment attempts and their curious connections with one another: moral treatment and phrenology. The historical influences of moral treatment and phrenology reveal the shaping force of rational construccions, or theories, on treatment practices in general. They also serve as less Cited examples of the manner in which health care narrowed its focus over the course of the 19th century from illness as a personal experience to disease as a pathological condition.
This narroWing focus followed a growing need in health care to justify any action with a rationale that was logical, that not only made sense but also could withstand a linear analysis of cause and effect. According to Schon, "The question 'How ought I act" could be reduced to a merely instrumental question about the means best suited to achieve one's ends" (1983, p. 33) . Practitioners resolved disputes about how to proceed by invoking a theory that explained the cause of the problem; they then discussed treatments in terms of the treatment's capacity to address the cause. At its outset, moral treatment seemed an eminently rational practice for treating mental illness; it derived support from popular medical theory that included phrenology. Over the course of the 19th century, however, scientific inquiry found the practice to be irrational.
The story of moral treatment and its use as an early form of occupational therapy is a complex one that invites many readings (Bell, 1980; Bockoven, 1963; Bing, 1981; Browne, 1864; Cooter, 1976; Dain, 1964; Deutsch, 1949; Digby, 1985; Foucault, 1965; Galt, 1973; Grob, 1973; Kirkbride, 1973; Leuret, 1840; Peloquin, 1989; PeloqUin, 1991; Scull, 1981; Tomes, 1984) , but one point seems certainmoral treatment and its connection to phrenology can be understood only after achieving some grasp of what the period's general health care was like Radical changes transformed earlier 19th-century health care practices to such a degree that Rosenberg called them, collectively, a therapeutic revolution. He wrote, "To understand therapeutics in the opening decades ... its would-be historian must see that it relates, on the one hand, to a cognitive system of explanation, and, on the other, to a patterned interaction between physician and patient" (1985, p. 39) . Health care practices will always reflect the rationalizations that patients and helpers assign to illnesses and the patterns of relationship to which they are accustomed.
metaphor-a particular way of looking al the body and of explaining both ht:alth and disease. The hodY was seen, mt:taphoricaIlY . as a system of dynamic interaClions with its environment. Health ur dis'ease resul~cd from a cumulative interaction hetwccn consti-[u[ional endowment and cnvironmencal circumstance. . The bouy wa~ alwaY5 in a jlalC of l)CCOlllillg -allu l!lUj alwayj ill It: OPardy. (1985, p. 39) Two corollary assumptions ~owed from this central theory: first, every part of the body is related to evelY other; second, the body seeks balance through a process of intake and output. Equilibrium means health; disequilibrium means illness. Staying well was the embodiment of balance Rosenberg explained that "the American physician in 1800 had no diagnostic tools beyond his senses, and it is hardly surprising that he would find congenial a framework of explanation which emphasized the importance of intake and outgo" (1985, p. 41) . The body was thus seen as an ever-changing system, and physicians aimed to maintain its natural balance. The physician's most potent action was to "regulate the secretions -to extract blood, to promote perspiration, or the urination or defecation which attested to his haVing helped the body to regain its customary equilibrium" (Rosenberg, 1985, p. 41) . Drugs and purgatives restored balance; the sweat, diarrhea, or skin lesions that followed their administration imitated the bodily functions that accompanied natural recovery.
With a perspective that held that climate or job could change the body's balance, physicians saw environmental, occupational, and interpersonal experiences as important. They acknowledged that the mind and body are separate entities but are always in close connection wi[h each other. Furthermore, because each patient was deemed a "unique physiological identity," physicians investigated constitutional, familial, and environmental factorS in treating what they called the :,pecijicity of illness (Rosenberg, 1985, p. 44) . Treatment was individualized because the manifestation of any illness was thought unique. Because patients also held this belief, home remedies mirrured those of physicians. The system was thought rational because it passed [he test of linear analysis: treatments addressed the cause of illness.
The Advent of Change
During the first quarter of the 19th century, however, discontent grew over what people began to see developing: the "routinism and frequent severity" of drugging and purging (Rosenberg, 1985, p. 45) . Although many physicians struggled with their doubts about the older ways, Rusenberg has contended that few mid-century American practitioners rejected traditional therapeutics. The principle of specificity especially, argued Warner (1986) , is one to which physicians adhered tenaciously: the commitment of American physicians to [herapeutic specificity was remarkably durable. Despite the dramatic upheavals that occurred in therapeutic theory, epistemology, and practice during the last two thirds of [he 19th centuf)', the princi pie of specificity endured virtually uncontested as a central dogrna in the accepted therapeutic hdief system. Not until the 1860s did its in~uence begin to weaken substantially (Warner, 1986, p. 58) . Physicians clung to the belief that iJlness was an individual experience.
An emerging empirical trend began to increasingly challenge [he efficacy of therapeutics [hat did not pruve successful in clinical trials. To most American practitioners, this new skepticism seemed at first more suited to European academics who did not treat and interact with patients (Rosenberg, 1985) . Physicians knew their role: to create meaningful regimens for patients who held traditional beliefs in the body as a dynamic system. Most physicians thus enaued methods that held some continuity with traditional ones. When heroic dosing with drugs seemed extreme, physicians lessened [he dose but continued the practice.
Over the years, a differing perception of illness grew more prevalent: diseases were seen as distinct entities with specific courses and symptoms. Many ailments were seen as self-limiting and needing no intervention. Illnesses did not signify a systemic imbalance after all. This new perception notwithstanding, most patients still sought the kind of medical care that they had received in the past. If a regular physician wuuld not provide a treatment thought effective, patients might easily turn to a homeopathic or botanic physician whose methods were more traditiunal.
This new and conflicting conccp[ of illness, combined with expeuations from patients that physicians persist in the old ways, posed a dilemma. Treatments no longer seemed rational in that they did not seem congruent with the causes of iJJness. Physicians saw little congruence between the demands of clinical practice and those of laboratory science (Rosenberg, 1985) . However, according to Rosenberg, "even when they felt anxiety in particular cases, physicians took assurance from the knowledge that they were follOWing a mode of rractice endorsed by rational understanding and centuries of clinical experience" (1985, p. 44) . The push to be therapeutic among their patients was at first larger than the push for methods considered scientific or rational.
In time, however, the traditional belief system that had borne centuries of scrutiny was judged blind to the true nature of disease and lesions. The new sys[em, based on previously unseen bodily parts and sciemifically established norms, promised more sensible remedies than traditional methods based on metaphor. By the end of the 19th century, skepticism about traditional therapeutics dominated medical practice. Strategies such as bloodletting and purging were viewed as unscientific compared with the numerical standards that flowed from medical circles in Germany and France. Warner explained that the shift ill lht: Iht:rapeueic conception of dist:ase frOIll a disturhance of the central balance to a deviation f,'om [he normal state alr~red the categmies by which clinical Ihinking organil.ed Iheraries .... The physiological therapeutisl found il more salisfying [(J give a febrile palient an antipyretic [Q nOl"malize temreraturc, chloral hvdrate to encourage sleep, or a cardiac sedJlive 10 reduce pulsc rate rathcr than 10 elevate or reduce thc ~ntirc sy~tem.
(l9R6, p 26R) Instrumental measurement and chemical tests became better guides to understanding illness than the physician's senses; consultation of numerical norms supplanted inquiry into the patient's experience. This New Rationalism deemed compartmentalization and quantification of bodily problems congruent with the new vision of illness (Warner, 1986) . Within the context of these shifting perspectives, the practice of moral treatment developed and dwindled, reflecting the popular metaphor of illness in its inception and the new recognition of disease in its decline. Moral treatment, likened to the current practice of milieu therapy among mentally ill patients, was truly a practice of its time.
The story of moral treatment, as it is told in its connection with phrenology (a practice known to many as the study of bumps on the human skull) emphasizes the push for success and right solutions. As caring a practice as moral treatment seems, and as much as the term moral treatment implies the kindness sought by patients today, the story can easily sober those who claim that caring was easier then.
Insanity in the Early 19th Century
In the early 19th century, and within the traditional metaphor of the human body as a dynamic system, societv's perception of insanity changed: persons with mental illness were deemed capable of reason. Before this change, they had beenjudgecl lacking in rational capacity and therefore considered less than human. Their condition had heen thought a matter of possession. In 1864, physician Browne described the type of treatment that reflected this belief:
As you entcrcd, lhe creak of bolts and thc clank of chains WCl"C SGII"Cc1y di,tinguishahle amid the ,,·ild chorus of shrieks and soo, "'hich i,suell from every 'lrarrment. Thc rassages wen: narrow. lIark, damp. exhaled an offen,iv~ ,mell, were never Iight~d after sunSC(, and were rrovided with a door al every two or (hrcc yards. Your condul'lor IVas stern and surl\'; he carri~d fit accompanimcnts -a whip and a bunch of keys. The firSt room \'ou examined might mea~ure 12 bv 7, with a window, placed n~ar the ceiling, which did nO[ open, and without a fireplace, or mcan, fOt-arrifici;ll helling, and without fUI·nilure.
. Cruclt\'. and chaining" and drownings, and rigiclconflncment, were resoned tu, nUl so much hecaw,e the guardians wcre inhumane or unsvmpalhising, bUl to qucnch the spiril, [() frightcn men into thcir senses, tu subduc and lrain, 10 overcomc and tame the passions. (1864. pp. 309-31O)
Brutal methods promised to break the irrational "beast" (Deutsch, 1949, p. 80) . When judged irrational, persons with mental illness were treated as animals. Physicians aimed to control, not harm, them. Only when patients were thought capable of controlling their bestial natures could treatments move toward relationship and
The American Journal o/Occupalional Therapy carc. GroWing confidence in the reasoning powers of patients inspired the enactment of humane treatments: individualized care, a balanced routine of work and recreation, and an effort to help patients shape desirable traits (Peloquin, 1989) . The picture of patients working at domestic crafts or cultivating the farmlands of the asylum differs dramatically from an earlier one of disheveled lunatics, isolated and terrorized, chained to walls. From their vantage point 150 years later, Dain and Carlson called the practice caring; they likened moral treatment to "a psychological medicine that constituted milieu therapy" (1960, p. 131) . One 19th-century physician described moral treatment thus:
OUI' moral manag~ment chicfly con,ists in allowing every ratienr all thc lioenv consi,tent with his own safely and that of others; to conciliate his good will by kindness and gentlenes, of manner; to excite in him the sentiment of self-respcl'l; to exercise his judgement Isicl in useful and agrceable occupations; to diven him from hi, hallUCinations by pleasant and innocent amusements; and to pur,ue that system of needful and Ivholesome discipline and reslraint which is least irritating and offensive. Our mellical trealment consisls in r~s(()ring cvery part of the human ,ystcm (() iI' healthy funclion. (Gall, 1973, pp. 496-497) The folJowing anecdote from another physician, Leuret, serves nicely as case narrative and speaks to the imagination of moral treatment: J had one palicnt, an old fllIdler, whom I had not heen ahle to draw out He oeliev~lI that he was being trailed by the police and conse<juenrlv did not dare or carl' to hudge. In order to make him rise, walk, or feed himself, entr~aty and even compulsion were nc:ccssarv. I was unahle [() make further progress with him until I thought of th~ violin I Icd th~ patient inro the bathing-room, wrncd on the shower. and at the ,ame time gave him a violin. He had to choose between them. ) greatl)' f~ared he would choose the show<:r. He hesitalcd for guite somc limc hut finally lhe m~mory of his calling I'elurned; he lOok the violin and played a lune of hi, choice .... T,,·o months aflcr rcsuming his inSlrumcnt he was discharged cureel, to conrinue lhe practice of his calling, and for his entire lrealment J had used only music. (1948, p. 27) Physicians were kinel and concerned. They foune! nurses and attendants of the best character who became constant companions for one to six patients each (Galt, 1973, p. 498) . Patients and scaff members dined together regularly in one large room to invoke a sense of family. Staff members used restraints rarely and only when patients might harm themselves or others. Energetic activity, they thought, would release hostility. The practice seems personal by roday's standards; rractitioners seemed to care, and a caregiver's character mattered as much as skills.
In these small early asylums, moral treatment brought success; patients who received such care were cured. Nor surprisingly, these successes led to a wild optimism -a "cult of curability" (Dain, 1964, p. 78) This humane practice took shape in the hands of the medical profession. Physicians, enacting what seems to be a holistic function, actively sought the roles of asylum superintendent and director of moral treatments. What shaped physicians' regard for the emotional nature of their patients, when just preViously the unbridled passions of patients had been considered beastly:> And why did medical practitioners, then called alienists, believe themselves suited to provide moral treatment:> The change in attitude began when physicians extended the traditional metaphor about illness to include insanity; events in contemporary America, they argued, were part of the dynamic system that bred insanity. America was industrializing, and crowding cities caused immeasurably more emotional stress than had life in the country. Tension and chaos taxed a person to the point of illness and moral insanity. The recognition of insanity as a mental illness was radical. Clark explains:
The essence of the Victorian medical view of mental disorder may be described as the interpretation of dualism. Abnormal mental states were seen as lapses from a dualistic norm.... [n the completely healthy individual. these tWO conditions, mental and physical, coexisted and maintained a certain relational equilibrium between themselves, but did not normally interact with or otherwise influence each other directly. .
[n states of mental ill health, howevn, this normal or "nacurar' autonomy of psychical Ii fe was severely reduced, or even lost altDg<:ther. ... Diseased physical processes, as it were. spilled over from their original sphere Df action in the physical organism into the normally closed domain of mind, impairing or suspending the action of the normal psychological processes. (1981, p. 274) This belief in the connection between mind and body turned what had been previously viewed as madness into a matter of ill health that begged medical intervention
Phrenology: A Rationale for Moral Treatment
At this point, the phrenological theory proposed by Franz Gall and Johann Spurzheim (1967) becomes important to understand, because it offered a rational basis for medical physicians to provide moral treatment to persons with mental illness. A formal definition of phrenology cited by Young includes its ultimate decline:
Phrenology: a doctrine that the excellence of mental faculties or traits is determined by the size of the hasic area upon which they depend and that this can be iudged by the development of the skull overlying the area. ,v[odern psychology rejects entirely the faculty psychology: and modern neurology has entirely disproved the kind of brain localization asserted in phrenology. The praerice is roday a form of quackery. (1970, p. 9) As complex and curious a phenomenon as reading of bumps on the skull grew to be, phrenology gave influential alienists further cause to provide and promote moral treatment -a rational link that connected emotional concerns to a medical condition (Cooter, 1976 After securing his medical degree in 1785 and establishing a successful practice in Vienna, Gall began to study the human brain. His inquiries followed twO distinct courses: he dissected the brain, and he observed cranial features. He then rendered skilled and accurate drawings of his work. Gall's method of dissection was novel, enabling him to produce drawings unlike any before. Brain dissection had previously consisted of sawing the head in half and then examining cross-sections of brain tissue. Gall (1807) unfolded the brain section by section, gently peeling and scraping to see the interconnecting parts.
Much of Gall's research also consisted of noting connections between skull protuberances and a person's daily behaViors. Gall created casts from the heads of persons who had strong personality traits, and he later collected their skulls for comparison with his casts. Many considered his work empirical science. One anecdote describes Gall's method (Haskins, 1839) . He assembled numerous boys, many of them thieves, and divided the crowd into three groups: those who admitted stealing, those who claimed to be horrified by it, and those who seemed indifferent. During his examination of the boys, Gall found a similar cranial prominence on each of the thieves. Curiously, not one who claimed to deplore stealing had such a prominence. Those who claimed indifference had only a slight bump, if any. After a number of such observations, Gall concluded that underlying the protuberance on each thiefs skull was an organ whose enlargement explained the propensity to steal: the organ of acquisitiveness. In addition, Gall obtained the skull of a woman who imagined herself pregnant with five children, and one lump was very developed on the skull's surface. Gall concluded that the underlying organ of love of offspring was highly developed (Spurzheim, 1970) .
Coupling his empirical and anatomical studies, Gall named 27 distinct mental organs and localized them in gyral areas that he said controlled human functions (Hall, 1977) . This direct referencing on the convolutions of the brain marked the beginning of cerebral localization (Clarke & Dewhurst, 1972) . Gall specified each organ's location only after repeatedly discerning major protuberances on many skulls. Three assumptions emerged from Gall's work: all human behavior is a manifestation of brain activity, the brain is a "congerie of many separate organs," and each organ's size reflects its degree of development (Hughes, 1986) . Intellectual faculties such as cunning and talent for languages, and moral faculties such as pride and goodness, reflected the functioning of the brain organs that controlled them. The propositions of phrenological science seemed reasonable, and if they relied on inferences, Gall's outstanding anatomical work gave them credibility.
Spurzheim, Gall's assistant, elaborated on the meaning of phrenological principles in the treatment of insanity. Overreligiosity in a patient, he argued, might signify an overdeveloped organ of veneration, whereas marked isolation might indicate an underdeveloped organ of amativeness. Phrenological treatment involved stimulating the action of whatever organ might counterbalance the effects of the problematic one (Spurzheim, Knight, & Moris on, 1827). A physician might coax a violent patient, for example, into engaging in nurturing activities, hoping to thereby activate the instincl ofgeneration and offset the violent activity indicative of an oversized organ of murder. Phrenology thus proposed sensible applications that alienists could use within the context of moral treatmemo Even those physicians who thought these principles of oiganology speculative could support any method that promoted restoring the balance thought so importam in treating any illness in the early 19th centu0'· Phrenological theoly and moral treatment were wellmatched. Phrenologists hypothesized that less developed brain organs could be enlarged by involVing the patient in enVironments, actiVities, and imeraerions that exercised those faculties controlled by the organs. The organ of101le
ofoffspring, for example, might be enlarged by engaging a patient in positive experiences with young children. The optimism of this theory was consistenr with the belief that moral insanity was caused by societal forces such as industrialization and city living. The enVironmental, occupational, and interaerional practices that could develop brain organs were also the essence of moral treatment. Phrenology added a new dimension to moral treatment: as insanity was cured in the asylum, changes occurred in brain organs. Because of the physical effects of moral treatment, it seemed logical that physicians prOVide moral treatment. The focal point of phrenological imervention was the physical brain, but appropriate therapeutics consisted of the more traditional and holistic strategies that had a physical effect. These treatlllems were deemed rational because they WithstOod linear analysis: the method addressed the problem.
Cooter described the appeal of phrenology:
When Gall and Spurzheim paraded rhrough rhe awlums and pris, ons of Germany and described with uncannv accuracv rhe reasons whv each inmarc \\'as confined. their cnrourage of physicians. w;lI'ders, and civic officials cuuld hardlv do orherwise [han believe that this was a con'ecr system, however marvelous. (1976, pp. 16-17) Earlier metaphysical theories had held that madness sig- (Carlson, 1958) .
The Advent of Change
Moral treatment ,vas soon affected by the same shifts in theory that visited general medicine. Articles in the AmericanJournal ofInsanitv increasingly supported the theory that insanity was ca used by a lesion in the brain (Brigham, 1844) . Anatomical evidence of lesions in brain tissue unsettled the central metaphor of illness and the principles of phrenology. When, in 1861, Paul Broca of Paris located the human speech center in the third convolution of the cerebellum -a site far removed from Gall's localization of the organ of speech -phrenology faltered as a science (McCord, 1969) . Simultaneous!y, because of many events that changed the character of asylum care such as overcrowding and staff shortages, physicians could no longer rout the cures of moral treatment (Bockoven. 1963; Peloquin, 1989) . europhysiologyadvanced to scientific status, with ample proof of brain lesions but little in tums of therapeutics. Alienists soon accepted a new theory of mental illness: heredity, and nor any systemic imbalance from emotions or the environment, produced the lesions that led to insanity. Hereditv theory doused optimism about any form of cure. Although physicians could veri~' the existence of brain lesions with their newly developed technologies, no known treatments could either heal these lesions or change the inheritance that had caused them. This sure knowledge of causality supplanted traditional therapeutics that had been successful but addressed only speculative causes. By the 1870s, most physicians were pessimistic about medical treatment, and moral treatment became a minor form of therapy even in the most affluent asylums (Dain, 1964) Teither caring practices nor environmemal interventions seemed justified in the new scheme. Alienists embraced the anatomically sensible and scientifically verifiable theory, and in the process, savs Coorer (1976), they lost the rationale (phrenology) that was essential for the continued advancement of moral thel·apv.
Discussion
The compleXity of phrenology, alternately called a sci-ence, a philosophy, and a religion, counters any view that it was the singular force that propelled moral treatment. Both moral treatment and phrenology emerged within a context in which patients and practitioners, sure of their old beliefs, used methods that addressed the relationships between persons and environments, between the mind and the body. Both moral treatment and phrenology floundered when this rational construction was debunked.
This particular reading of the story of moral treatment may suggest that practitioners should restore the 19th-century belief that caring is linked to cure. If helpers saw time spent in conversation, if they saw caring expressions as actions that cured, surely they would endorse such practices. What if helpers applied rational formulae such as "discussing the meaning of illness lowers patien ts' blood pressure" or "listening to patients discuss their values yields great gains in treating depression?" Might practitioners then act with care?
Gregg believes that such caring would be short-lived, arguing that real understanding will elude helpers who seek it through the lens of what is rational: "It [rationality] does not furnish us with tastes, significance, values, and meaning.... For in illness, fear, anxiety, shame, and uncertainty call for understanding, sympathy and imagination, courage and companionship" (1941, p. 98) .
Patients today, as in earlier days, ask their helpers to encourage them through their illnesses. They ask that helpers care, not because concern may cure, but because caring serves humanity. To embed caring in a formulaic connection with cure is to risk losing sight of its centrality in practices that do nOt always cure.
Moral treatment and the caring that it emhodied flourished when persons saw themselves and their worlds as connected and interdependent. When practitioners saw that illness had personal meaning, they worked to personalize treatment. Several 19th-century ideas bear remembering. A practitioner using his or her senses can find clues about the meaning that each person ascribes to illness. Patients are persons whose recovery goes hand in hand with their being thought unique. A patient's experience of illness is important to understanding and restoring health. Patients and their helpers are capable offine behaViors when given the chance. Helpers who give kindness and lend courage can do so openly.
Each of these 19th-century ideas makes good sense for a 20th-century health care practice. To once again see illness as a life experience, to regard the senses as ways of understanding, to regard the patient as singular, a practitioner must expand any rational theory that values cure or success over kindness. If occupational therapists want the heart of moral treatment to survive the shifts of everchanging theories, they must hold caring attitudes, words, and actions at the center of their practice.
This position can be an affirming one for occupational therapists who often struggle against difficult odds to create a climate of caring. If giving a crossword puzzle to a patient who might complete the task during leisure hours is not reimbursable, it is a gesture that embodies the kindness of moral treatment. If asking a patient how a weekend PQSS WQS spent is not p~rt of the tre~tment pl~n, it is a communication that embodies the concern of moral treatment. If giving a patient several choices during each treatment session is not part of a protocol, it is an action that embodies the faith in human capacity that is the hallmark of moral treatment. If occupational therapy treatments are mora!, they may be more readily perceived as caring. A
